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HUGHES V. JACKSON: RACE AND RIGHTS
BEYOND DRED SCOTT
MARTHA S. JONES
With its focus on race and rights in Maryland, this Article opens
a new chapter in the history of black citizenship before the Civil
War. Evidence from Maryland's courts, legislature, and local
courthouses establishes that free black Americans were not the
people with "no rights" that Roger Taney imagined them to be.
Nor, however, were they citizens in an unqualified sense.
Appearing before state officials, free black Americans were able
to assemble a bundle of rights-to travel, to bear arms, to make
and enforce contracts, to freely exercise religion, and, central to
this Article, to sue and be sued. They waged contests over, and
sometimes won, the very rights that by 1866 came to be termed
"civil rights" and with the Fourteenth Amendment would come
to be the substance of birthright citizenship.
From high court deliberations into the lives of free black
Americans, this Article examines the story of Samuel Jackson
and reveals that debates over race and rights were not the matters
of abstract reasoning or an end unto themselves. Samuel
Jackson, this Article shows, may have won the right to sue and be
sued for himself and for free black Marylanders generally. He
did not, however, succeed in obtaining custody of his children.
The liberty of free black Americans, and hence the integrity of
Jackson's family, would come only in the wake of the Civil War
and the state constitution's abolition of slavery. Thus, the
meaning of rights remained constrained if they did not also
provide a means to a more just end.
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INTRODUCTION
Samuel Jackson's confrontation with Dred Scott v. Sandford'
began, not in a Supreme Court reporter, but instead in his local
courthouse. There, in Dorchester County, Maryland, Jackson told a
story that began in March of 1851.2 Two free African American
farmers, Josiah and William Hughes, had "forcibly and violently"
seized Jackson's five minor children: Lilly, Ellen, Theodore, Dennis,
and Mary.' A free African American laborer, Jackson did not hesitate
for long. He appeared before the clerk of the circuit court and swore
out a bill of complaint.' The charges included trespass, assault and
battery, breaking and entering, the misappropriation of property (his
children), and $1,000 in damages.s Initially, the case languished, and it
seems the parties attempted a settlement.' However, with matters still
at an impasse in April of 1856, the circuit judge empanelled a jury.'
After a brief trial, they found in favor of Jackson.' He and his family
were awarded $750 for the wrongs committed against them.'
The matter could have ended here. However, Josiah Hughes
appealed the local court's ruling to the Maryland Court of Appeals,
the state's high court, transforming Samuel Jackson's grievances from
1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. Hughes v. Jackson, 12 Md. 450, 450 (1858). The Article's analysis of Hughes v.
Jackson is drawn from the text of the Maryland Court of Appeals 1858 decision, the
records of the court, including Jackson's manuscript brief, Briefs, Maryland Court of
Appeals, S375-21, Maryland State Archives, Annapolis, Maryland [hereinafter Records of
the Court], and the case file in Samuel Jackson v. Denwood Hughes, William Hughes, and
Alward Johnson, Dorchester County Circuit Court, Equity Papers., T2318-3, Maryland
State Archives, Annapolis, Maryland [hereinafter Case File]. The sources entitled Records
of the Court, also cited in note 3, and Case File, also cited in notes 3-4, 120-21, 144-66, are
archival in nature, and the North Carolina Law Review was unable to review them for
substantive support. The author has viewed the sources in person and vouches for the
accuracy of the textual assertions they support.
3. Hughes, 12 Md. at 450; Case File, supra note 2; Records of the Court, supra note 2.
4. Case File, supra note 2.
5. Hughes, 12 Md. at 450-51.
6. See id.; Case File, supra note 2.
7. Hughes, 12 Md. at 451.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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a highly contested local matter into an occasion for testing the reach
of the Dred Scott decision. In that 1857 landmark case, the United
States Supreme Court had deemed all black Americans to be non-
citizens of the United States and thus without any claim before the
federal government.10 Chief Justice Roger Taney's majority opinion
turned, in part, on the history of race and rights in the individual
states, with Taney infamously asserting that, at the nation's founding,
black men and women had "no rights which the white man was bound
to respect."" This view defined the status of black Americans with
respect to the Federal Constitution, Taney concluded.12 Hughes v.
Jackson3 posed a similar question to the State of Maryland: What
was the status of free black Marylanders and what rights, if any, did
they possess before the law?
Free black Americans presented a thorny legal puzzle that had
produced a muddled history of constitutional provisions, legislative
schemes, and everyday practices in Maryland. In the founding era,
property-owning free black men had exercised basic civil rights:
voting, suing and being sued, and contracting.14 It was in 1802 that a
constitutional amendment limited the franchise in Maryland to the
"free white male citizen."" Black laws were gradually set in place
during the early republic era, and by the antebellum decades,
Maryland had a wide-ranging scheme of restrictions.'" A bright-line
distinction emerged between the legal status of free black versus free
white people, drawn by laws that set unique terms for African
American gun and dog ownership, travel, vocation, public assembly,
and punishments for criminal convictions. Still, state-supported
10. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1857).
11. Id. at 407.
12. See id. at 405.
13. 12 Md. 450.
14. David Skillen Bogen, The Maryland Context of Dred Scott: The Decline in the
Legal Status of Maryland Free Blacks 1776-1810,34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 381, 387 (1990).
15. See David S. Bogen, The Annapolis Poll Books of 1800 and 1804: African
American Voting in the Early Republic, 86 MD. HIST. MAG. 57, 62-63 (1991) (offering the
1801-02 Maryland constitutional amendment as an example of the disenfranchisement of
African Americans during this time period).
16. For an overview of black laws, see generally STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE BLACK
LAWS: RACE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN EARLY OHIO (2005) (detailing Ohio's use of
"legal principles to abridge civil and natural rights of racial minorities" during the
nineteenth century, id. at 2). For a summary of black laws in Maryland, see generally
CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS, FREEDOM'S PORT: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF
BALTIMORE 1790-1860 (1997) (recounting the development of Baltimore's black
community "from a transient aggregate of migrant freedpeople ... to a strong
overwhelmingly free community" and describing the impact of black laws on this
community, id. at 2).
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colonization projects remained voluntary, and proposals to re-enslave
free African Americans failed, suggesting a fragile but discernible
distinction between free and enslaved black Marylanders. 7
By 1850, a statewide convention contemplated a new constitution
and the status of free black Marylanders generated a prolonged and
contentious debate. Some delegates insisted upon a distinction
between "citizen" and "freeman," suggesting that the former clearly
excluded free African Americans from legal protections since they
were non-citizens." Others argued that free black people were mere
"denizens" in the sense that they were legitimate residents of the state
but without the same rights and privileges of citizens.19 Some
suggested that it was imprudent to put free people of color outside
the "pale of [the constitution's legal] protection," while others took
the view that the convention could only refuse them legal protection
"[i]f they distutb [sic] the peace."20 William Blakistone, a former
Speaker of the State Assembly, argued that once "a human being,
native, or foreigner, white or black, bond or free, sets his foot upon
[state] soil, he is under the protection of the laws of the State." 2 In
this view, the law must guarantee to free African Americans security
in their persons and property.22 In the end, the convention could not
arrive at a consensus and passed the question on to legislators and
local officials. Whether free black Marylanders were denizens,
citizens, or something else remained an unsettled question.
17. For a compilation of Maryland's black laws, see JEFFERY R. BRACKETT, THE
NEGRO IN MARYLAND: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY 66-72 (Books for
Libraries Press 1969) (1889).
18. See 1 MD. REFORM CONVENTION, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION TO REVISE THE STATE CONSTITUTION 194 (1851)
(noting that one delegate moved to amend an article by replacing "freeman" with
"citizen," indicating that these were not always viewed as interchangeable words).
19. Id. at 196 ("Under the old Constitution there seems to have been no difference in
the quality of citizenship between freemen of whatever color; but in 1809 the political
power of the State was vested in free white male citizens only, and the whole subsequent
history of our legislation, demonstrates that the free colored population have been
regarded as denizens only, who are entitled to no other privilege, or domicil, than such as
the law of the State accords.").
20. See id. at 259.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 259-60 (reciting Blakistone's comments regarding "the protection of the
laws of the States" in light of a proposal to amend "the twenty-first article of the Bill of
Rights"). The article on which Blakistone was commenting stated "[t]hat no freeman
ought to be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." Id. at 194.
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From the perspective of black Marylanders, the Dred Scott
decision offered only one answer among many to questions about
race and rights. The decision came in 1857, late in what was already a
long-standing debate about the legal status and standing of free
African Americans.2 3 A remarkable range of conflicts preceded that
case; free black citizenship was not a matter of first impression in
1857. Black Marylanders had long been navigating a complex and
shifting legal terrain in which lawmakers seemed unable to agree
upon or fix their status. Free black activists asserted they were
citizens, forcing courts and state legislatures to grapple with their
claims.24
While they decried the decision, few black Marylanders felt the
impact of Dred Scott. Only a short list of disabilities flowed from
Roger Taney's conclusion; as non-citizens of the United States, free
African Americans were barred from federal courts in civil cases,
denied passports, and excluded from federal employment.25 To
declare black Americans to be non-citizens of the United States did
not reach, however, to the core of their juridical lives. Legal status
was only occasionally determined by way of federal law. In the
United States of the 1850s, state and local courts heard, tried, and
decided matters from freedom suits and trials of racial determination
to ordinary civil and criminal matters.26 State and local self-
governance were at the core of antebellum legal culture.27 The legal
23. In an 1838 treatise, African American legal commentator William Yates
recounted much of this debate. See generally WILLIAM YATES, RIGHTS OF COLORED
MEN TO SUFFRAGE, CITIZENSHIP AND TRIAL BY JURY: BEING A BOOK OF FACTS,
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES, HISTORICAL NOTICES AND SKETCHES OF DEBATES-
WITH NOTES (1838) ("The object of this book is to call to mind, from the records of the
past, some of many testimonies to be found of the rights and services of colored men." Id.
at iii.).
24. See MARTIN ROBISON DELANY, THE CONDITION, ELEVATION, EMIGRATION,
AND DESTINY OF THE COLORED PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 48-51 (1968).
25. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 429-31 (1978).
26. See ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER: SLAVERY AND MASTERY IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN COURTROOM 22-46 (2000); ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD
WON'T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA 3-4, 30-39 (2008); GLENN
MCNAIR, CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: SLAVES AND FREE BLACKS IN GEORGIA'S CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 44-45, 53-54 (2009); JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, BECOMING FREE,
REMAINING FREE: MANUMISSION AND ENSLAVEMENT IN NEW ORLEANS, 1846-1862, at
15, 59, 72-74 (2003); CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, ROOTS OF DISORDER: RACE AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1817-80, at 30-36 (1998).
27. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH
12-16 (2009); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1-2 (1996).
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questions that ran through the lives of free black Marylanders were
almost exclusively governed by state laws. Indeed, when examining
the dockets of the state's federal district courts, one sees that even
before Dred Scott, free African Americans rarely sought out federal
courts as a venue.28 The contrast with scenes from state courts is
striking. There, black Americans were regular, if not ordinary,
participants in legal culture.29 The story of race and rights before the
Civil War played out, not in federal courts, but in state and local
venues.
This Article, with its focus on race and rights in Maryland,
examines in a new light this history of citizenship before the Civil
War. Evidence from the state's courts, legislature, and local
courthouses establishes that free black Americans were not the
people with "no rights" that Roger Taney imagined them to be." Nor,
however, were they citizens in an unqualified sense. Appearing
before state officials, free black Americans were able to assemble a
bundle of rights-to travel, to bear arms, to make and enforce
contracts, to freely exercise religion, and, as explored in this Article,
to sue and be sued. They waged contests over, and sometimes won,
the very rights that by 1866 came to be termed "civil rights" and with
the Fourteenth Amendment would come to be the substance of
birthright citizenship.3' Finally, following the story of Hughes v.
Jackson from high court deliberations into the lives of Josiah Hughes
and Samuel Jackson reveals that debates over race and rights were
not the matters of abstract reasoning or an end unto themselves.
Samuel Jackson, this Article discovers, may have won the right to sue
and be sued for himself and for free black Marylanders generally. He
did not, however, win custody of his children. Their liberty, and hence
the integrity of Jackson's family, would come only in the wake of the
Civil War and the abolition of slavery through the state's new 1864
constitution. The meaning of rights remained constrained if they did
not also provide a means to a more just end.
28. Records of District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21, United States
National Archives and Records Administration Philadelphia Regional Archives,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania [hereinafter Records of U.S. District Courts]. This source, also
cited in note 88, is archival in nature, and the North Carolina Law Review was unable to
review it for substantive support. The author has viewed the source in person and vouches
for the accuracy of the textual assertions it supports.
29. See Martha S. Jones, Leave of Court: African American Claims-Making in the Era
of Dred Scott v. Sandford, in CONTESTED DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM, RACE, AND POWER
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 54,55-56 (Manisha Sinha & Penny Von Eschen eds., 2007).
30. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857); infra Part II.
31. See Jones, supra note 29, at 55, 60.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines how the
Maryland Court of Appeals assessed the implications of Dred Scott
for the individual states and then rejected its logic and affirmed the
right of free black people to sue and be sued in the state's courts. Part
II examines the broader debate over Dred Scott, explaining how
federal and state courts limited the decision's reach. Part III moves
away from high courts and Dred Scott to reexamine Hughes in the
context of the local courthouse. It uncovers how the interests of free
black litigants were part of the fabric of local legal culture with
lawyers and judges as essential participants in scenes of claims-
making. Hughes did not begin as a claim for "rights." Instead, it
began as a dispute over one party's claim of family integrity and
another's claim of property in persons. Part IV retells the case from
the lived experience of Hughes and Jackson. While Jackson
ultimately won the right to sue and be sued in Maryland for himself
and all free black claimants, he lost in his effort to secure control and
protect the well-being of his children.
I. THE APPEAL
Dissatisfied with the jury's conclusions and failing to win a new
trial at the circuit court level, Josiah Hughes appealed to the
Maryland Court of Appeals.32 His claims were, in one sense, routine.
Hughes sought to overturn the verdict or otherwise have it set aside
for a number of technical defects." For example, Jackson had failed
to indicate that he was a "free" negro in his initial pleadings, inviting
the presumption that he was a slave and thus incapable of bringing
suit.34 Hughes also asserted a more novel position. The year was 1858,
and he argued that the United States Supreme Court's logic in Dred
Scott should decide the matter.3 5 Arguing before a three-judge panel,
32. See Hughes v. Jackson, 12 Md. 450, 451 (1858).
33. See id. at 451, 462-63.
34. See id. at 462 (describing the question presented to the court as "whether a negro
can maintain an action in this State, without first averring in his pleadings, and establishing
by proof, his freedom").
35. See id. at 455. The literature on the Dred Scott case is voluminous. See, e.g.,
AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1837-1857 (2006); FEHRENBACHER, supra note 25; MARK A.
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); VINCENT
C. HOPKINS, S.J., DRED SCOTr's CASE (1951); KENNETH C. KAUFMAN, DRED SCOrr'S
ADVOCATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROSWELL M. FIELD (1996). However, remarkably little
written about the Dred Scott era has examined how the decision may have shaped the
experience of legal personhood and citizenship for free African Americans. In subsequent
literature, scholars have remained close to the text of the case and its prominent actors.
For example, Taney has been scrutinized, from Don Fehrenbacher's suggestion of a pro-
2013] 1763
1764 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91
Hughes's attorney, Elias Griswold, asserted that Samuel Jackson
(and, by curious implication, his own client), as a free black
Marylander, was without standing before the state court, as had been
Southern bias to Mark Graber's vision of a disciplined judge whose views were consistent
with "the mainstream of antebellum constitutional thought." Compare FEHRENBACHER,
supra note 25, at 557-58, with GRABER, supra, at 28-30. Austin Allen has tried to
reconcile Taney's record, explaining that his decision sought to both protect slavery and
the interests of corporations. ALLEN, supra, at 161. Perspectives on Taney court dissenters
John McLean and Benjamin Curtis provided a counter-point to Taney's conclusions. See
generally Justin Buckley Dyer, Lincolnian Natural Right, Dred Scott, and the
Jurisprudence of John McLean, 41 POLITY 63 (2009) (arguing that the harsh treatment of
Justice McLean's dissenting opinion is ill-founded); Lucas E. Morel, The Dred Scott
Dissents: McLean, Curtis, Lincoln, and the Public Mind, 32 J. Sup. CT. HIST. 133 (2007)
(summarizing the dissenting opinions in the case and Lincoln's perspective on the case).
Figures from Missouri's legal culture have helped explain early developments in the case;
Supreme Court Judge Hamilton Gamble and Dred Scott's attorney, Roswell Field, have
been the subjects of biography-length treatments. See generally DENNIS K. BOWMAN,
LINCOLN'S RESOLUTE UNIONIST: HAMILTON GAMBLE, DRED SCOTT DISSENTER AND
MISSOURI'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNOR (2006) (offering an in-depth perspective on Justice
Gamble's life and beliefs); KAUFMAN, supra (discussing the life and advocacy of the
attorney that represented Dred Scott). Some legal historians have tried to displace Dred
Scott altogether by offering cases like Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842),
and Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859), as more important to the
understanding of slavery and federal power in antebellum legal culture. See Paul
Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania: Understanding Justice Story's Proslavery Nationalism,
22 J. Sup. Cr. HIST. 51, 54 (1997); Michael J. C. Taylor, "A More Perfect Union": Abelman
v. Booth and the Culmination of Federal Sovereignty, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 101, 113 (2003).
Dred Scott has also served as a touchstone for social and cultural historians of race and
citizenship. Walter Ehrlich's careful study of the Scott family's legal challenges ushered in
studies of freedom suits in Missouri and other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Austin Allen, The
Political Economy of Blackness: Citizenship, Corporations, and Race in Dred Scott, 50
CIV. WAR HIST. 229, 235-36 (2004) (describing a Kentucky freedom suit); William E.
Foley, Slave Freedom Suits Before Dred Scott: The Case of Marie Jean Scypion's
Descendants, 79 Mo. HIsT. REV. 1, 2-22 (1984) (recounting a family's multi-generational
attempts to obtain freedom). See generally WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE No RIGHTS:
DRED Scorr's STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (1979) (detailing the Scott family's cases both
in state and federal courts). Likewise, a great deal is known about the effect of the case on
Scott and his family members, including his wife, Harriet. See LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS.
DRED SCOTT: A LIFE ON SLAVERY'S FRONTIER 236-39 (2009). Reactions to the case
have been brought to light: Catholics, free black Americans, and political leaders such as
Abraham Lincoln, have all weighed in. See Patrick W. Carey, Political Atheism: Dred
Scott, Roger Brooke Taney, and Orestes A. Brownson, 88 CATH. HIST. REV. 207, 209, 213-
19 (2002); Gary J. Jacobsohn, Abraham Lincoln "On this Question of Judicial Authority":
The Theory of Constitutional Aspiration, 36 POL. RES. Q. 52, 53 (1983); Todd F.
McDorman, Challenging Constitutional Authority: African American Responses to Scott v.
Sandford, 83 Q. J. SPEECH 192, 200-01 (1997). Literary historians have explained how the
decision shaped literature from Martin Delany's Blake to the works of Henry James. See
Sara B. Blair, Changing the Subject: Henry James, Dred Scott, and Fictions of Identity, 4
AM. LITERARY HIST. 28, 35-36 (1992); Gregg D. Crane, The Lexicon of Rights, Power,
and Community in Blake: Martin R. Delany's Dissent from Dred Scott, 68 AM.
LITERATURE 527, 529-30 (1996).
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Dred Scott before the federal court.36 Even if the court concluded
that Jackson's pleadings could be properly amended, Griswold urged,
no black person, enslaved or free, had standing to sue in the state.
Jackson's case, he thus insisted, must be dismissed. 7
Hughes provided Maryland's high court its first opportunity to
consider the implications of Dred Scott. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice
Roger Taney held that people of African descent, be they enslaved or
free, were not citizens of the United States." Black people had not
been citizens of the individual states at the time the Constitution was
ratified, Taney asserted, and thus were not included among the
citizens of the new United States.39 They were without standing
before federal courts, where diversity jurisdiction extended standing
to citizens alone.40 Griswold suggested that, in Maryland, legal
remedies for Jackson were similarly out of reach.41 His argument was
not tightly woven. Griswold did not rely upon specific citizenship
language in the Maryland State Constitution, nor did he elaborate
upon some necessary relationship between federal citizenship, which
had been Taney's subject, and the state citizenship that might have
been relevant in the Jackson case. Instead, Griswold made a vague
but cunning cultural-legal argument that might have inclined the
court to bend toward the interests of white supremacy.42 He referred
to the "opinion of Chief Justice Taney in [] Dred Scott" to support the
view that if Jackson was without standing to sue, the court itself was
without jurisdiction.4 3 Then, without elaboration, Griswold declared
that if no law extended civil rights to black Marylanders, "the plaintiff
in this case had no right to sue.""
Jackson's attorneys, James Wallace and Charles Goldsborough,
confronted the problem of Dred Scott directly, arguing that Maryland
should take a distinct position on the question of African American
standing to sue and be sued.45 Their argument relied upon an
alternative view of history. Since the latter decades of the eighteenth
century, Jackson's attorneys explained, African Americans "going at
36. Hughes, 12 Md. at 451-55.
37. See id. at 452-55.
38. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857).
39. Id.
40. See Hughes, 12 Md. at 452-55.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 455.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 459.
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large and acting as free" had been viewed as free men.46 When the
United States Constitution was ratified, they had given evidence in
court and performed other acts such as voting that only subsequently
had been reserved to white men in the State of Maryland. 4 ' A free
African American occupied an "anomalous position, having more
rights than a stranger, yet not the same as an heir. He [could] sue and
be sued in [the] courts, hold property and enjoy the fullest protection
of [the] laws."48 Jackson's counsel carefully distinguished the United
States citizenship that was the subject of Dred Scott from citizenship
in the State of Maryland, arguing that even if Jackson was disqualified
under the Federal Constitution, "[h]e might still [have been] a citizen
of a State, and as such a free man." 49
Dred Scott did not carry the day in Maryland. Samuel Jackson
was entitled to his day in court, explained Chief Justice John Carroll
LeGrand in writing for the court of appeals.so In Maryland, there
were only two instances in which black people were presumed, by
their color, to stand apart from white Americans in legal culture."
Blackness barred African Americans from testifying as witnesses
against white people, and in freedom suits, blackness raised the
rebuttable presumption that they were slaves.52 Otherwise, black
Marylanders enjoyed a broad right to sue and be sued." The court
addressed the relevance of Dred Scott through Taney's own
approach-a history of race and rights. "From the earliest history of
the colony," LeGrand explained, "free negroes have been allowed to
sue in our courts and to hold property, both real and personal, and at
one time, they having the necessary qualifications, were permitted to
exercise the elective franchise."54
In Justice LeGrand's view, race had never served as an absolute
bar to rights in Maryland.55 This was consistent with the state's
interests:
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 464. For an overview of LeGrand's tenure on the Maryland Court of
Appeals, see CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: A HISTORY
153-61 (1928).
51. Hughes, 12 Md. at 463.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 463-64.
54. Id.
55. See id.
1766 [Vol. 91
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To deny to them the right of suing and being sued, would be in
point of fact to deprive them of the means of defending their
possessions, and this, too, without subserving any good purpose
.... Neither the policy of our law, nor the well-being of this
part of our population, demands the principle of exclusion
contended for by the appellant. 6
LeGrand looked ahead and suggested, "[S]o long as free negroes
remain in our midst a wholesome system induces incentives to thrift
and respectability, and none more effective could be suggested than
the protection of their earnings."" Maryland's high court rejected
Taney's view of both the history and the status of free black
Americans. Justice LeGrand laid out for black Marylanders a bundle
of rights." It was an imperfect, partial, but still potent, bundle of
rights: to sue and be sued, to hold real and personal property, to
defend possessions and earnings, and in some cases, to vote. 9 Justice
LeGrand concluded by affirming the lower court judgment.60 Samuel
Jackson was entitled to his children and his $750.
II. BEYOND DRED SCOTT
Hughes presented a matter of first impression for the Maryland
Court of Appeals, placing state court judges in a remarkable position
to assess Justice Taney's ideas. Had Maryland's high court adopted
the Chief Justice's views on race and rights, one might not be
surprised. 61 Taney was Maryland legal culture's favorite son. 62 He
56. Id. at 464.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 463-64. The "bundle of rights" metaphor resembles T.H. Marshall's view
that citizenship cannot be reduced to any specific right and that many Americans
throughout time have possessed only a partial version of citizenship. See T.H. MARSHALL,
CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS 10-27 (1950). While the author
does not share Marshall's view that citizenship rights can be characterized as progressively
amassed, his metaphor displaces the view that citizenship can be reduced to a "yes or no"
matter or that it can be reduced to any one right, such as those of naturalization or the
franchise.
59. Legal historian David Bogen carefully examines the legal status of black
Marylanders in the early republic and demonstrates that black Marylanders experienced a
decline in their standing at the start of the century. See Bogen, supra note 14, at 396-411;
see also Bogen, supra note 15, at 62-63 (discussing the passage of the 1802 Maryland
constitutional amendment that denied black Marylanders the right to vote).
60. See Hughes, 12 Md. at 464.
61. For a history of the Maryland Court of Appeals, see generally Hall Hammond,
Commemoration of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of the Maryland Court of Appeals: A
Short History, 38 MD. L. REV. 229 (1978) (detailing the court's 200 year history). Notably,
the court was restructured pursuant to the state's new 1851 constitution, which provided
for, among other innovations, the election of Maryland Court of Appeals justices for ten-
year terms. Id. at 235.
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began his legal career practicing in Maryland and then served as a
state legislator and Attorney General. 63 Throughout his years in
Washington, Taney remained a keenly followed and highly regarded
figure. Until the late 1850s, his family home was in Maryland.' He
spent extended time in Baltimore, where he sat on the United States
Circuit Court for the District of Maryland and, on occasion, presided
over public gatherings, including local bar proceedings.' In rare
moments of candor, when Taney sought out a sense of how Dred
Scott was received, he turned to his close allies in Maryland.'
Statewide, Dred Scott received extensive public acclaim, with some
commentators deeming the decision well-reasoned and profoundly
correct.67 LeGrand likely understood Taney's concerns. Indeed, he
and Taney had a great deal in common, though they were born a
generation apart. Both men were raised in slaveholding households.68
Each had practiced law in Baltimore before entering public service.6 9
Taney had served as Maryland's Attorney General, while LeGrand
had held the office of Secretary of State.70 The two were also active
62. In addition to chronicling Taney's decisions and his terms on the Baltimore
Circuit Court bench, local papers reported his day-to-day activities. See Local Matters,
THE SUN, July 16, 1851, at 1 (naming Taney as one of the honored guests at St. Mary's
College's commencement); Local Matters, THE SUN, Apr. 28, 1851, at 1 (describing how
Taney was in attendance at the Archbishop Eccleston's funeral); Married, THE SUN, Feb.
10, 1852, at 2 (reporting the marriage of Taney's daughter, Maria, to Richard T. Allison);
Meeting of the Members of the Baltimore Bar, THE SUN, July 12, 1853, at 1 (reporting that
Taney was called from his home to preside over a memorial honoring the recently
deceased Judge John Glenn); J. W., Letter from Old Point Comfort, THE SUN, Aug. 1,
1851, at 1 (noting Taney and his family vacationing at Old Point Comfort, Virginia).
63. See CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 28-37,114-15 (1935).
64. See id. at 469-72.
65. See id. at 353-57.
66. See Letter from Roger Brooke Taney to James Mason Campbell (Feb. 18, 1861)
(on file with the Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md.). This source is archival in
nature, and the North Carolina Law Review was unable to review it for substantive
support. The author has reviewed the sources in person and vouches for the accuracy of
the textual assertions.
67. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 25, at 2-3 (describing the reaction to the case
nationwide); GRABER, supra note 35, at 1 (claiming that Dred Scott "may have been
constitutionally correct"); The Decision in the Supreme Court, THE SUN, Mar. 9, 1857, at 2.
68. See BOND, supra note 50, at 153-61 (offering a brief overview of LeGrand's life);
SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY, LL.D., CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 124-25 (1872) (regarding Taney).
69. TYLER, supra note 68, at 160 (regarding Taney); The Late Hen. John C. Legrand,
Chief Justice of the State of Maryland, THE DAILY DISPATCH (Richmond), Jan. 11, 1862,
at 2 (regarding LeGrand).
70. TYLER, supra note 68, at 163 (regarding Taney); The Late Hen. John C. Legrand,
Chief Justice of the State of Maryland, supra note 69 (regarding LeGrand).
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lay leaders in the city's Catholic Church.71 Both men were moderate
pro-slavery voices whose ideas reflected a paternalism that was
characteristic of Maryland's pro-colonization white elites.72
On the rights of black people in legal culture, however, LeGrand
and Taney parted ways. Despite the general admiration for Taney
and their shared cultural sensibilities, LeGrand rejected the Chief
Justice's reasoning and unequivocally refused to extend Dred Scott to
the State of Maryland.7 3 This disjuncture between Dred Scott and
Hughes cautions against broad assumptions about the influence of
Dred Scott. State high courts rejected the Supreme Court's brutal
logic. 74
By September 1858, Taney was uncomfortably aware that legal
commentators and high court jurists were questioning his reasoning
on the matter of black citizenship.75 Highly vexed, Taney privately
penned a supplemental opinion to Dred Scott that focused on one
matter alone: the status of African Americans at the time of the
Constitution's ratification.7 6 As he had in Dred Scott, Taney engaged
in an extended historical analysis to show that African Americans had
enjoyed no rights from 1689, as British colonial subjects, through 1787
when the United States Constitution was ratified. The supplemental
opinion was no mere exercise in argumentation. Taney explained that
he stood ready should the Court's docket present him with another
71. See TYLER, supra note 68, at 475-76 (regarding Taney); The Late Chief Justice
LeGrand, THE SUN, Dec. 31, 1861, at 1 (regarding LeGrand).
72. Regarding Taney, see CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 97-99 (1961).
See also Timothy S. Huebner, Roger B. Taney and the Slavery Issue: Looking Beyond-
and Before-Dred Scott, 97 J. AM. HIST. 17, 32-37 (2010) (describing the change in
Taney's views on the institution of slavery over time). Regarding LeGrand, see Letter
from John Carroll LeGrand to Hon. Reverdy Johnson (Jan. 10, 1861) (on file with the
author). This source is archival in nature, and the North Carolina Law Review was unable
to review it for substantive support. The author has reviewed the sources in person and
vouches for the accuracy of the textual assertions. For an example of the pro-colonization
stance of one of the prominent members of the Maryland State Colonization Society, see
generally Eugene S. Vansickle, A Transnational Vision for African Colonization: John H.
B. Latrobe and the Future of Maryland in Liberia, 1 J. TRANSATLANTIC STUD. 214 (2003).
73. Hughes v. Jackson, 12 Md. 450, 459 (1858).
74. See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 281-82 (1981); see also John D.
Gordan III, The Lemmon Slave Case, 4 JUD. NOTICE 1, 1, 8-12 (2006) (discussing
Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860), a case in which the New York Court of Appeals,
post-Dred Scott, upheld a New York statute, which abolished slavery in the state and
caused the emancipation of Lemmon's slaves in transit from Virginia to Texas when they
transferred vessels in New York).
75. See Roger Brooke Taney, Supplement to the Dred Scott Opinion, in TYLER,
supra note 68, app. at 578-79, 598-608.
76. See id. at 578-608.
77. Id. at 579-93.
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opportunity to clarify and to persuade: "If the questions come before
the Court again in my lifetime, it will save the trouble of again
investigating and annexing the proofs." 78
Taney defensively scoffed at reviews "adverse" to his published
opinion in Dred Scott.79 He suggested that his critics based their views
on "misrepresentations and perversions."" Still, the Chief Justice
could not refrain from a thinly veiled rebuttal to Horace Gray's 1857
pamphlet, A Legal Review of the Case of Dred Scott. Gray was the
Reporter of Decisions for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
and he would later be appointed to the bench, first to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1864 and then to the United States
Supreme Court in 1881." His thorough analysis of the opinions in
Dred Scott led Gray to conclude: "[T]he court have [sic] not, and
could not have, consistently with sound principles, decided that a free
negro could not be a citizen of the United States." 82 Gray challenged
Taney on doctrinal terms, but then went further to assault Taney's
character. 83 The Chief Justice's opinion, according to Gray, was "by
no means the ablest or soundest of the opinions" in the case.8 Its
"tone and manner of reasoning, as well as in the positions which it
assumes" were "unworthy of the reputation of [Taney] that great
magistrate."8 Taney replied that Gray's volume was "a disingenuous
perversion and misrepresentation of . .. what the Court ha[d]
decided."8 6 Taney concluded his supplemental opinion on this point,
urging that those "in search of truth .. . [would] read the opinion,"
and then asserted that he would not "waste time and throw away
arguments" on commentators such as Gray. Contrary to his stated
indifference to such criticism, Taney's tone and the lengthy
supplement itself suggest that he was all too aware that Dred Scott
was being called into serious question by well-informed legal minds.
78. Id. at 578. Historian Don Fehrenbacher characterizes Taney's supplemental
opinion as a "curious document." FEHRENBACHER, supra note 25, at 445. The opinion
would remain unpublished until nearly a decade after Taney's death. See TYLER, supra
note 68, at 485-86.
79. See Taney, supra note 75, app. at 607.
80. Id.
81. THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SoC'Y, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at 234 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993).
82. HORACE GRAY, A LEGAL REVIEW OF THE CASE OF DRED SCOTT, AS DECIDED
BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (1857).
83. See id. at 9.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Taney, supra note 75, app. at 607.
87. Id. at 608.
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Maryland's high court was not alone in limiting the effect of
Taney's ideas about free African Americans before the law. Perhaps
most stinging were those federal district courts that narrowly
construed the Chief Justice's opinion." Taney was clearly unsettled as
he recounted how, for example, the United States Circuit Court for
Indiana had held, even in the face of Dred Scott, that "a negro of the
African race born in the United States ... is a citizen of the United
States . . . and entitled as such to sue in its courts."" Justice John
McLean, Taney's colleague on the Supreme Court bench, had
dissented from the majority opinion in Dred Scott.90 When it came to
narrowing the decision's effect, McLean had no small hand in the
matter.91 In July of 1857, for example, newspapers reported that
McLean, while sitting on the United States Circuit Court for Illinois,
had limited the scope of Dred Scott in the case of Mitchell v. Lamar.
Joseph Mitchell, a free African American from the State of Illinois,
brought a suit against Charles Lamar, a white resident of Wisconsin.93
Lamar had assaulted Mitchell, who sustained significant injuries and
thus sought damages. 94 Did the federal court have jurisdiction?
McLean concluded it did and reasoned that Mitchell, a free black
man not descended from slaves, was a citizen in that he was "a
freeman, who ha[d] a permanent domicile in a State, being subject to
its laws in acquiring and holding property, in the payment of taxes,
and in the distribution of his estate among creditors, or to his heirs on
his decease." 95 McLean recognized that Mitchell did not enjoy rights
equivalent to those of white men. However, McLean reasoned, "[I]t is
not necessary for a man to be an elector in order to enable him to sue
in a Federal Court." 96 "Such a man," McLean concluded, "is a citizen,
so as to enable him to sue, as I think, in the Federal Courts." The
debate over African American citizenship, begun long before Dred
Scott, continued in its wake.
88. Records of U.S. District Courts, supra note 28.
89. See Taney, supra note 75, app. at 578.
90. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 529-64 (1857).
91. See Morel, supra note 35, at 134-38.
92. See Can Colored Men Sue in the Federal Courts?, WASH. REP., July 22, 1857, at 2;
Important Decision in the U.S. Circuit Court: James C. Mitchell vs. Charles Lamar, CHI.
DAILY TRIB., July 15, 1857 [hereinafter Important Decision].
93. See Can Colored Men Sue in the Federal Courts?, supra note 92, at 2; Important
Decision, supra note 92.
94. A Case Under the Dred Scott Decision, N.Y. HERALD, July 13, 1858, at 3.
95. Important Decision, supra note 92.
96. Can Colored Men Sue in the Federal Courts?, supra note 92, at 2.
97. Important Decision, supra note 93.
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Maryland's Court of Appeals was not alone in calling into
question the ideas expressed in Dred Scott. Judges in Maine and Ohio
outright refused to incorporate the logic of Dred Scott into their
determinations.98 In Ohio, the court confronted this question when
called upon to interpret the phrase "citizen of the United States" as
set forth in its own state constitution.9 9 Distinguishing Justice Taney's
opinion as narrowly limited to descendants of slaves, the court
declined to hold that a free man of mixed racial descent could never
be considered a citizen.'0o At the request of Maine's legislature, the
justices of Maine's high court interpreted a key provision of the state
constitution which provided in pertinent part, "Every male citizen of
the United States, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards ...
shall be an elector for governor, senators and representatives in the
town or plantation where his residence is so established."o' The
question for the court was whether free men of color could serve as
electors under this provision." While the law imposed no explicit
barrier to enfranchisement based on race, the court admitted that a
strict application of the logic of Dred Scott's holding would suggest
the qualification "citizen of the United States" necessarily excluded
free African Americans.103 Yet, Maine's supreme court rejected such
an interpretation:
98. See, e.g., Opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, on Question
Propounded by the Senate, 44 Me. 505, 508 (1857) (declining to apply Dred Scott when
interpreting the phrase "citizen of the United States"); Anderson v. Millikin, 9 Ohio St.
568, 577 (1859) ("The question is not, what the phrase 'citizen of the United States' means
in the light of the decision in the case of Dred Scott v. Sanford, but what the framers of our
[state] constitution intended by the use of that phrase, and what, in the connection in
which it is found, and with the light and knowledge possessed when it was used, it was
intended to mean."); see also Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, 41
N.H. 553, 553 (1857) (affirming constitutionality of "[a]n act to secure freedom and the
rights of citizenship to persons in this State," which was passed by the N.H. House of
Representatives on June 26, 1857). For an example in which a local court declined to
follow the reasoning in Dred Scott to bar an African American plaintiff from suing, see
generally Richard F. Nation, Violence and the Rights of African Americans in Civil War-
Era Indiana: The Case ofJames Hays, 100 IND. MAG. HIST. 215 (2004).
99. Anderson, 9 Ohio St. at 570. The court was required to interpret an 1851
amendment to the state's constitution, changing its requirement for electorship from
"white male inhabitants" to "white male citizen of the United States." Id. at 569-70. The
former, originally used in the state's 1802 constitution, had been widely interpreted to
include not only white males but also free men of mixed-race descent whose bloodline was
less than half-black. Id.
100. Id. at 572, 577.
101. Opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, 44 Me. at 507.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 508.
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[W]e are of the opinion that our constitution does not
discriminate between the different races of people which
constitute the inhabitants of our state; but that the term,
'citizens of the United States,' as used in that instrument,
applies as well to free colored persons of African descent as to
persons descended from white ancestors."
Thus, at least in some non-slave states, courts declined to afford
Dred Scott binding weight on matters of state jurisdiction, even when
United States citizenship was expressly implicated.
In at least one southern state, Mississippi, Dred Scott's reasoning
was deemed consistent with state law.10 Still, that state's high court
appeared to be of two minds. In the spring of 1858, the court held in
Shaw v. Brown 06 that a free African American had standing to sue in
pursuit of his claims as an heir.107 Writing for the majority, Justice
Alexander Handy explained:
[N]egroes born in the United States, and free by the laws of the
State in which they reside, are in a different condition from
aliens. They are natives, and not aliens. Though not citizens of
the State in which they reside, within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, they are inhabitants and
subjects of the State, owing allegiance to it, and entitled to
protection by its laws and those of the United States; for by the
common law, and the law of nations, all persons born within the
dominion of the sovereign are his natural born subjects, and
owe allegiance to him, and obedience to the laws, and are
entitled to protection. 0
The court acknowledged Dred Scott as establishing African
Americans as "a subordinate and inferior class of beings," but it did
not take the next step and deem them without standing to pursue
their claims in the State of Mississippi. 109 However, when confronted
with a similar set of facts the following spring of 1859, the court
embraced Dred Scott and deemed free black people "alien strangers,
104. Id. at 515-16.
105. See Heirn v. Bridault, 37 Miss. 209, 224-25 (1859); Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246,
315-16 (1858).
106. 35 Miss. 246.
107. See id. at 320-21.
108. Id. at 315.
109. Id. For background on Shaw, manumissions, and the right of emancipated black
non-residents to sue for their inheritances in Mississippi courts, see PAUL FINKELMAN,
AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 287-90 (1981); BERNIE D.
JONES, FATHERS OF CONSCIENCE: MIXED-RACE INHERITANCE IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH 55-57 (2009).
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of an inferior class, incapable of comity, with whom our government
has no commercial, social, or diplomatic intercourse.""o Justice
William Harris wrote for the majority while Justice Handy, who wrote
for the majority in Shaw just one year earlier, dissented."'
III. THE LOCAL COURTHOUSE
It would be a mistake, however, to dwell too long on this scene of
high court decision-making. The significance of Hughes goes beyond
questions of the competing doctrines that emerged at the end of the
1850s. This drama of race and rights had played out both in Chief
Justice LeGrand's chambers and in a local courtroom. Its chief
protagonists were judges and individuals such as Samuel Jackson,
who swore out complaints in local courthouses. What LeGrand, a
judge, and Jackson, an African American laborer, both knew was that
the Hughes case was not an isolated instance. Yes, few cases of race
and rights made their way to Maryland's Court of Appeals, but
dozens more emerged each day in the state's local courthouses.
There, black Marylanders had long participated in rituals of legal
culture, including suing and be sued. At times, race constrained their
rights, though more often race was but one factor in a more complex
set of rules and rituals. For LeGrand, the inclusion of black
Americans in legal culture was foremost a mechanism of social
control intended to engender "thrift and respectability.""' One might
wonder if Samuel Jackson did not in fact disagree with the judge.
Surely he believed that he would achieve more than his own
constraint when he filed a complaint against Josiah Hughes. Surely,
for Jackson, his petition was intended first and foremost to assert
authority over his family. To achieve this, he enlisted legal culture's
110. Heirn, 37 Miss. at 224-25. The majority in Heirn rejected Shaw and its reliance on
comity to hold that a free black woman from Louisiana had no right to sue for her
inheritance in Mississippi, ultimately concluding, "[F]ree negroes ... are to be regarded as
alien enemies or strangers prohibiti, and without the pale of comity, and incapable of
acquiring or maintaining property in this State which will be recognized by our courts." Id.
at 233. For a detailed analysis of how Mississippi fit into the broader antebellum trend of
states "denying blacks' legal citizenship and [] insisting on their foreignness," see Kunal M.
Parker, Citizenship and Immigration Law, 1800-1924: Resolutions of Membership and
Territory, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 168, 180-81 (Michael
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
111. See Heirn, 37 Miss. at 234 (Handy, J., dissenting) ("[Because plaintiff was] alleged
to have been a citizen of Louisiana, [] the presumption is, that her rights and capabilities as
such continue. The question, then, as to her right, as a free person of color of the State of
Louisiana, to take a legacy, is the same as that decided in Shaw v. Brown.").
112. Hughes v. Jackson, 12 Md. 450,464 (1858).
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rituals and rights, from the local courthouse to the Maryland Court of
Appeals.
Dorchester County sat on Maryland's Eastern Shore, that
portion of the state where slaveholding remained extensive and pro-
slavery politics dominated the region.113 Still, the area's proximity to
the free states generated tensions. Rumors of impending slave
insurrections and rising numbers of escaped slaves generated a tense
solidarity among slaveholders. A convention of slaveholders in
November of 1858, just months after the Dred Scott decision,
concerned the status of the region's free black population, including
men like Hughes and Jackson. Free African Americans were said to
corrupt and demoralize slaves, and a final resolution concluded that
"free negroism and slavery [were] incompatible."" 4 Between 1850
and 1860, the Eastern Shore's free black population grew by fourteen
percent."' Many landholders in the region depended upon free black
labor.1 16 These circumstances made men like Hughes and Jackson a
visible and troublesome presence.1'
What did it mean for individuals such as Jackson to sue and be
sued in antebellum America? Most often, the terms of such
proceedings and the meanings to be extracted from them were left to
local figures. If black Marylanders indeed possessed a bundle of rights
enforceable at law, the task of interpreting those rights was left to
judges and lawyers, clerks and commentators, witnesses and litigants,
including free African Americans like Samuel Jackson. Indeed, when
examining Jackson's case and the Dorchester County Circuit Court
docket more closely, one sees that neither Justice Taney's conclusion
about constitutional impermissibility, nor Justice LeGrand's view of
social control, fully captured the meaning of the right to sue for black
Marylanders. Local court officials had assumed Jackson's right to sue.
Judge Brice Goldsborough, who had sat on the trial court bench since
1835 and was a slaveholder, did not question his court's jurisdiction."18
113. See BARBARA JEANNE FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE
GROUND: MARYLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 66-67 (1985).
114. Convention of Slaveholders, THE SUN, Nov. 6,1858, at 1.
115. See FIELDS, supra note 113, at 70.
116. See id.
117. See id. (noting that by 1860, free blacks made up nineteen percent of the Eastern
Shore's total population).
118. Brice Goldsborough would preside over the county court until 1851. 3
BALTIMORE: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE 843 (1912). After turning to law practice in
that year, he would later be appointed to the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1860, where
he sat until his death in 1867. Id. at 843-44.
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Nor did the clerk who accepted Jackson's complaint.1 19 Similarly,
local jurors, all white men, did not appear reluctant to hear and give
credit to Jackson's claim. 120 It was this group of "respectable" citizens
who awarded him damages of $750.121 Courts in Maryland were
accustomed to encountering black litigants.
Local lawyers might have differed on questions of race and
rights, yet many built careers and reputations representing black
litigants. In Hughes, all the attorneys ably represented African
American litigants, seeming to affirm Jackson's right to sue. Yet, their
arguments diverged significantly. Jackson's own attorneys rested their
reputations on the right of free African Americans to bring suit.
Charles F. Goldsborough was a twenty-one year old practitioner
when Jackson's case began. 12 2 Also a slaveholder, Goldsborough was
the son of the state's former Governor.123 Goldsborough teamed with
James Wallace, a somewhat more experienced practitioner who also
built his reputation representing black Marylanders. 124 Josiah
Hughes's attorney, local practitioner Elias Griswold, appeared to be
of two minds. He represented an African American litigant, but he
ultimately argued that all free black Marylanders, including his client,
had no right to sue in the state's courts. 125 By 1858, when Hughes was
119. Clerk's Docket, Dorchester County Circuit Court, T2510, 1855-1858, Box 2,
01/41/01/002, Maryland State Archives, Annapolis, Maryland [hereinafter Clerk's Docket].
This source, also cited in note 160, is archival in nature, and the North Carolina Law
Review was unable to review it for substantive support. The author has reviewed the
sources in person and vouches for the accuracy of the textual assertions.
120. Case File, supra note 2.
121. Id.
122. For biographical information on Charles F. Goldsborough and the other actors in
this historical drama, see generally ELIAS JONES, HISTORY OF DORCHESTER COUNTY,
MARYLAND (1902).
123. Id. at 308.
124. Perhaps most memorably, Wallace defended Samuel Green, a free black man who
was found in possession of the book Uncle Tom's Cabin and charged under state law with
aiding fugitive slaves. See ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, Biographical Series: Samuel Green
(b. 1802-d. 1877), MSA SC 3520-13785. Goldsborough and Griswold, as state's attorneys,
were the prosecutors and Wallace's opponents. Sam Greene and Uncle Tom's Cabin,
ANNAPOLIS GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 1858, available at http://www.collinsfactor.com/
newspaper/samuelgreennews.htm.
125. See Hughes v. Jackson, 12 Md. 450, 452-53 (1858) ("A slave having no civil rights,
cannot, in Maryland, sue or be sued in an action of trespass . . . and the court must
presume one described in an original writ and all the proceedings in a case as a 'negro,' to
be a slave.... If he was described as a 'free negro,' a plea to the merits would acquiesce in
his description of himself, and throw upon the defendant the burden of denying his
freedom and right, but in the absence of any description except 'negro,' he is presumed to
be a slave, and the whole action and proceedings are null and void." (internal citations
omitted)). Griswold's arguments set a high-perhaps practically unattainable-bar for
what it took to rebut the presumption of slavery:
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argued before the Maryland Court of Appeals, these men had a great
deal in common. Goldsborough and Griswold had served together as
state's attorneys, while Wallace and Goldsborough served together in
the state senate.126 Attorneys Goldsborough and Griswold and trial
Judge Brice Goldsborough were delegates to an 1858 slaveholders'
convention that decried both "abolitionism from abroad, and free-
negroism [from within]." 27 Zealously representing the interests of
free African Americans in Hughes, these men stood together and
argued before the state's high court over the rights of black
Marylanders, but from opposite sides.
Finding the trial judge and attorneys at an 1858 slaveholders'
convention is a reminder that debates over race, rights, and
citizenship did not unfold only in courthouses. In political culture,
lawmakers continued the debates that animated courtrooms, and
these deliberations suggest the ways in which free African Americans
were forcing a debate in the 1850s. Delegates to the 1858
slaveholders' convention had condemned "free negroism," deeming
the presence of free black people incompatible with slavery.128
Only when there is parole proof of twenty years or upwards, going at large, with
pregnant circumstances otherwise of freedom. But going at large, acting as free,
reputed as free, abandonment by master, are no sufficient foundation for such a
presumption, much less, in the absence of all proof of freedom, will the suing as a
negro raise a presumption of freedom.
Id. at 454. As Griswold concluded:
The law does not commit the folly and injustice of presuming negroes free, except
when the presumption is some benefit, to them in petitions for freedom. Justice,
the institution of slavery, or the master, asks no such presumption when the right
of the master is asserted, unless the presumption rests on the broad and proper
principle that they are always considered slaves by their natures, their capabilities,
their position among their superiors, by the law of the land, and by divine
arrangement and revealed law, their unfitness for civil rights, their need of
pupilage, protection and guidance.
Id. at 454-55 (emphasis added).
126. JONES, supra note 122, at 436, 440.
127. Convention of Slaveholders, supra note 114.
128. Id. In support of its conclusion, the resolution Griswold and Goldsborough both
contributed to noted,
[T]he existence among us of the present immense number of free negroes-their
habits of idleness and dissipation-the very heavy cost of prosecutions against
them for violations of our criminal law-the evil example and influence which they
exert towards our slave population, rendering them dissatisfied with their
conditions and comparatively worthless to their owners-their well-known
tampering with slaves, and agency in inducing them to abscond from servitude.
Id.
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However, when the same question came before a statewide
convention the following year, a majority defeated a proposal to
banish and/or enslave free black Marylanders.12 9 United States
Senator James Pearce spoke for the convention's majority when he
warned against losing the critical work of free black laborers. 0 In
Pearce's view, freedom itself was a "right" that free black men and
women had acquired "by .. . [the] laws and the tenderness of their
masters."'3 ' While Pearce's report was paternalistic and constrained,
it did advocate that free black Marylanders should continue to be
protected by law from banishment and re-enslavement.132
Free black activists were among those eager to explain the
conference's significance in terms of citizenship. Presbyterian minister
James W.C. Pennington, himself born enslaved in Maryland,
declared, "[T]he latest and most brilliant victory gained has been by
the free colored people of the State of Maryland."' This victory,
Pennington explained, was the result of a "fair face to face contest,"'34
waged for decades by "the most courageous" of free black activists,
who "stood like men of nerve, with hope and public faith in great
principles." 3 5 Nothing less than a slaveholders' convention, he
underscored, had affirmed that black people were Americans "at the
fundamental level of economic contribution."' 3 6 African Americans,
he argued, had proven themselves citizens.
129. J.W.C. Pennington, The Self-Redeeming Power of the Colored Races of the World,
ANGLO-AFR. MAG. 314, 317 (1859) (describing the 1859 convention's results as an
illustration of "what [their] brethren of Maryland ha[d] conquered in their conflict with
the slave power of their State").
130. See id. at 318.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 320 (resolving that "any measure for a general removal of the free blacks
from the State of Maryland [was] impolitic, inexpedient, and uncalled-for by any public
exigency which could justify it"). While Senator Pearce's report advocated legal protection
for free black Marylanders, it also envisioned a role for the law in controlling them, noting
that "the free negro population should be well and thoroughly controlled by efficient laws,
to the end that it may be orderly, industrious, and productive." Id. And while the
convention's delegates supported protecting free blacks, they were also keen to prevent
their numbers from expanding any further. The report concludes by recommending
revitalizing an 1831 manumission statute to prohibit any further slave emancipations and
"compel prompt removal from the State of those emancipated." Id.
133. Id. at 316.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 317. On Pennington, see generally DAVID E. SwIFr, BLACK PROPHETS OF
JUSTICE: ACTIVIST CLERGY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1989) (discussing the role of six
pastors, including Pennington, in the Afro-American freedom movement).
136. SwiFr, supra note 135, at 245.
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IV. THE LIMITS OF LAW
Hughes v. Jackson tells a new story about race and rights in the
antebellum United States. That story turns on the extent to which
free African Americans used small openings to win larger claims to
rights in the slaveholding state of Maryland.m' Samuel Jackson
prevailed in his material claim when the court of appeals upheld his
award of $750 in damages.3 8 Furthermore, the opinion of Chief
Justice LeGrand affirmed the right of free African Americans to sue
and be sued in the state, a right intended to provide black
Marylanders with a means of protecting their wages and property,
which in turn could help to maintain the social order in a state with a
large and still growing population of free black people. Still, the facts
that surrounded Hughes also make the point that citizenship and civil
rights are never quite enough, and that exercising the right to sue and
be sued did not guarantee just outcomes.
Hughes had begun more than a decade earlier when William
Hughes, a free African American farmer and landholder in
Dorchester County, purchased two enslaved people from Catherine
137. For an illustration of the dynamics of legal claims-making in non-American
contexts, see generally Alejandro de la Fuente, Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba:
The Tannenbaum Debate Revisited, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 339 (2004). De la Fuente
focuses on the example of enslaved people in Cuba and argues that in such instances those
who were structurally marginal to the law, including free people of color, were able to use
cultural knowledge and skills to gain the "enforcement of ... potentially favorable laws."
Id. at 368. For a micro-history analysis of claims-making in a post-emancipation nineteenth
century Cuban neighborhood, see generally Rebecca J. Scott, Reclaiming Gregoria's Mule:
The Meaning of Freedom in the Arimao and Caunao Valleys, Cienfuegos, Cuba, 1880-
1899, 170 PAST & PRESENT 181 (2001). Scott describes how claims-making contributed to
"the achievement of freedom from chattel bondage, and the struggle for freedom from
colonial rule." Id. at 183. For a detailed examination of the types of lawsuits that
commonly arose between slaves and their masters in Buenos Aires, Argentina, see
generally Lyman L. Johnson, "A Lack of Legitimate Obedience and Respect": Slaves and
Their Masters in the Courts of Late Colonial Buenos Aires, 87 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 631
(2007). Johnson identifies three primary litigation trends, including suits brought by
"individuals held as slaves who disputed their legal status, slaves who demanded the right
to purchase their freedom or the freedom of family members, and slaves who demanded
the right to seek new masters because of abuses suffered at the hands of their present
owners." Id. at 632. Finally, for an examination of litigation by former American slaves in
immediate post-emancipation Mississippi, see generally Christopher Waldrep, Substituting
Law for the Lash: Emancipation and Legal Formalism in a Mississippi County Court, 82 J.
AM. HIST. 1425 (1996). While Waldrep does not explicitly adopt claims-making as an
analytic framework, his study explores how "[Ilegal formalism provided Blacks new access
to the criminal justice system and, at the same time, undermined whites' immature
confidence in law as an instrument of their domination over Blacks." Id. at 1425.
138. Hughes v. Jackson, 12 Md. 450, 451, 464 (1858).
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S.M. Ray for the sum of $280.139 The transaction, recorded in the
county's chattel records, provided that Hughes would hold title to a
"certain Mulatto woman named Mary Teackle and her infant child
named Lilly."140 Hughes was to hold Mary and her daughter only for a
term of years (rather than a life term) that would commence on
August 15, 1840 and end eleven years later.14'
Hughes was head of a large household of free African
Americans. 4 2 There is no evidence he had owned a slave prior to
purchasing Mary and her daughter. It may be that Samuel Jackson
had a role in this arrangement from the outset. Jackson explained to
the court that sometime after Hughes purchased Mary and Lilly, the
two men entered into their own contract.143 Jackson purchased the
mother and daughter for the sum of $280, the same sum Hughes had
paid Ray.1" Jackson promised that he would repay that $280 by
laboring for Hughes for a period of five years.'45 Jackson explained
that at that moment he took "possession" of Mary and Lilly, who
then came to live with him, although he conceded that his agreement
with Hughes was never recorded.146
Over the subsequent years, Jackson continued to work for
Hughes. Samuel and Mary had five children together: Lilly,
Theodore, Dennis, Ellen, and Mary.'47 Jackson termed Mary his wife,
and while there is no record that they were married under law, he
explained that they had lived together and borne children.148 Mary
dropped the last name Teackle and adopted the name Jackson
instead.'49 The trouble began, it appears, sometime after Mary and
Lilly's term of service expired, in 1851.1' After the death of William
Hughes, his sons and heirs accused Jackson of taking his family to the
nearby city of Cambridge with the intent of transporting the entire
139. Dorchester County Circuit Court, Chattel Records, 1852-1860, Volume 776, page
195-96. This source, also cited in notes 140-42, is archival in nature, and the North
Carolina Law Review was unable to review it for substantive support. The author has
viewed the source in person and vouches for the accuracy of the textual assertions it
supports.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Manuscript Census Returns, Division 8, County of Dorchester, State of
Maryland 29 (1840).
143. Case File, supra note 2.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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household to Baltimore."5 ' William Hughes, it is said, followed the
group to Cambridge, warning local ship captains not to let the family
board. 52 He claimed them as his property and took them to his
home.' In short order, Hughes sold three of Jackson's children-
Ellen, Theodore, and Dennis-to a local white farmer, Alward
Johnson.'54 The circuit court docket evidences the aggressiveness of
Jackson's response. He filed six freedom suits, one for his wife Mary
and one for each of his children as their next friend.'"' He also filed
two actions for damages. 156 The first was against Denwood and Josiah
Hughes (as executors for their late father, William) and against
Alward Johnson, charging that they had conspired to deprive him of
his property in his own children.'57 He filed a second damages suit,
the suit that we know as Hughes v. Jackson, against Josiah Hughes as
executor for his late father William. 5 Jackson sought $1,000 in
damages.'59
What precisely had happened here? Were the Hugheses now
breaching the oral contract entered into by Jackson and William
Hughes many years before? Were William Hughes's sons and heirs
unaware of the agreement between Jackson and their father? Had
Jackson himself breached the agreement in some material sense? Or
were the Hughes brothers betting that their word as prosperous
landholders might win over that of Jackson, a poor farmer and
laborer who had no documentation of his story?
The court record never directly addressed these questions, but as
one follows these life stories, one can surmise how the court saw
them. Jackson's suit against Josiah and Denwood Hughes and Alward
Johnson was discontinued in October of 1852, and Jackson paid the
defendants $19.53 in costs." Johnson's purchase of Ellen, Theodore,
and Dennis was left to stand as valid.161 Indeed, they remained
Johnson's property until November of 1864, when they became free
pursuant to the state's new constitution, which abolished slavery. 162
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.; Clerk's docket, supra note 119.
160. Case File, supra note 2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Samuel Jackson's wife, Mary, and their daughters, Lilly and Mary,
resumed living together with him as a family." Their freedom papers,
recorded some years later, would say that Mary and her daughter
Lilly were free pursuant to the purchase contract entered into
between William Hughes and Catherine Ray.'" Samuel Jackson's
alleged contract with William Hughes was never enforced, and in the
final suit for damages, Jackson received an award of $750 from the
Hughes family for their having held daughters Lilly and Mary
contrary to law.165
CONCLUSION
Samuel Jackson has left only shards of his family's story-notes
in the docket books of the Dorchester County court, census returns,
and freedom papers. Yet, to suggest what his reflections must have
been does not take an unorthodox leap of imagination.
Hughes had established for Jackson and for other free black
Marylanders a fundamental right: to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, it
had not won him control over his family. The Hughes's actions seem
not to have been taken recklessly; Josiah Hughes valued his
reputation to some degree and likely had a pretext for seizing
Jackson's children. The following year, in 1852, Josiah Hughes served
as a representative to the state's colored colonization convention, and
later in the 1860s, he would seek ordination to the ministry in the
African Methodist Episcopal Church.166 Jackson's first thought was
likely about the integrity of his family, while the Hughes's concern
may have been about their reputations as creditors and as local
community leaders. And it was in their local courthouse that these
men, and others like them, negotiated the terms of their lives.
Still, as previously discussed, these men disagreed in a sense
about their right to sue in that very courthouse. While Jackson took
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. For details on the proceedings of the Convention of Free Colored People of the
State of Maryland of 1852 and the resolutions it adopted, see generally A Typical
Colonization Convention, 1 J. NEGRO HIST. 318 (1916). Josiah Hughes attended as a
member of the Dorchester delegation and was elected co-secretary of the Convention. See
id. at 326. However, he had to be replaced on the second day after he returned home with
the majority of his co-delegates out of concern for the hostile atmosphere outside the
meeting. See id. at 326-27. For further background on the nineteenth century colonization
movement in Maryland and an insightful narrative account of the 1852 Convention, see
generally C. Christopher Brown, Maryland's First Political Convention by and for Its
Colored People, 88 MD. HIST. MAG. 324 (1993).
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the view that he was entitled to sue, the Hughes brothers would
ultimately take the contrary view. Was the Hughes's position a
potentially self-defeating one? Certainly. After all, they sometimes
used the local courthouse to pursue their own claims. It was also self-
serving. The prospect of a loss to Jackson and liability for a $750 fine
may have appeared far more pressing than the theoretical question of
rights. Under the circumstances, arguing that one's opponent lacked
standing could indeed ricochet and undermine one's own standing,
but in the short run, the exercise of rights for these men was simply a
means to an end. Ironically, it was Justice Taney who saw those rights
as an end in themselves and was thus determined to extinguish them.
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